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Abstract
We revisit Byzantine tolerant reliable broadcast with honest dealer
algorithms in multi-hop networks. To tolerate Byzantine faulty nodes
arbitrarily spread over the network, previous solutions require a fac-
torial number of messages to be sent over the network if the messages
are not authenticated (e.g. digital signatures are not available). We
propose modifications that preserve the safety and liveness proper-
ties of the original unauthenticated protocols, while highly decreasing
their observed message complexity when simulated on several classes
of graph topologies, potentially opening to their employment.
Introduction
Designing dependable and secure distributed systems and networks, that are
able to cope with various types of adversaries (ranging from simple errors
to internal or external attackers), requires to integrate those risks from the
very early design stages. The most general attack model in a distributed
setting is the Byzantine model, where a subset of system participants may
behave arbitrarily (including malicious), while the rest of participants re-
mains correct. Also, reliable communication primitives are a core building
block of any distributed system.
We consider the reliable broadcast with honest dealer problem in pres-
ence of Byzantine failures i.e., the problem of distributing information from
a source to every other process considering that a subset of nodes may act
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arbitrarily. The reliable broadcast primitive is expected to provide two guar-
antees: (i) safety i.e., every message m delivered by a correct node has been
previously sent by the source and (ii) liveness i.e., every message m sent by
a correct source is eventually delivered by every correct node.
We are interested in solving this problem in a multi-hop network, in
which nodes are not directly connected to every other (i.e. the network is
not complete). In particular, nodes may have to rely on intermediate ones
(hops) in order to communicate, forwarding messages till the final destina-
tion. In case the entire system is correct the solution to reliable broadcast
is trivial: every node has just to forward the received messages to all of its
other neighbors (or it has to question a routing table to know which is the
next node to route a specific message) and if the network is connected then
it is possible for every node to communicate with every other. Contrarily,
if just one single node is faulty, specifically Byzantine faulty, two problems
may arise: (i) messages can be modified or generated by faulty nodes that
pretend the messages were sent from another node (ii) and messages can be
blocked preventing nodes to communicate. It follows that a more sophisti-
cated protocol has to be put in place to ensure the correct communication
between the parties.
Lastly, we are interested in unauthenticated solutions, namely in proto-
cols where messages cannot be directly authenticated (e.g. employing digital
signatures) and thus the nodes cannot immediately verify that a specific re-
ceived message has been previously sent by a specific other node.
The reliable broadcast with honest dealer enables to simulate a com-
pletely connected distributed system equipped with reliable and authenti-
cated channels. It follows that all the solutions designed for completely
connected distributed system (Byzantine Agreement, Byzantine Reliable
Broadcast etc.) can be directly deployed on top of a multi-hop network
once the reliable broadcast service has been deployed.
Related Works
The necessary and sufficient condition to solve the reliable broadcast with
honest dealer problem on general networks has been identified by Dolev [7],
demonstrating that it can be solved if and only if the network is 2f ` 1-
connected, where f is the maximum number of Byzantine faulty nodes.
Subsequently, research efforts followed three paths: (i) replacing global
conditions with local conditions, (ii) employing cryptographic primitives, or
(iii) considering weaker broadcast specifications.
The Certified Propagation Algorithm (CPA) [24] is a protocol that solves
reliable broadcast in networks where the number of Byzantine nodes is locally
bounded, i.e., in any given neighborhood, at most f processes can be Byzan-
tine. This algorithm has been later extended [23] along several directions:
(i) considering different thresholds for each neighborhood, (ii) considering
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additional knowledge about the network topology, and (iii) considering the
general adversary model.
The Byzantine tolerant reliable broadcast with honest dealer can also
be addressed employing cryptography (e.g., digital signatures) [5, 9] that
enables all nodes to exchange messages guaranteeing authentication and
integrity (authenticated protocols). The main advantage is that the problem
can be solved with simpler solutions and weaker conditions (in terms of
connectivity requirements). However, on the negative side, most of those
solutions rely on a third party that handles and guarantees the cryptographic
keys, thus the safety of those protocols is bounded to the crypto-system (a
potential single point of failure).
Lastly, the broadcast problem has been considered weakening safety
and/or liveness property e.g., allowing to a (small) part of correct processes
to either deliver fake messages, or to never deliver a valid message [17–19].
Let us note that a common assumption considered by Byzantine tolerant
reliable broadcast protocols is to use authenticated point-to-point channels,
which prevents a process from impersonating several others (Sybil attack)
[8]. The real difference between cryptographic (authenticated) and non-
cryptographic (unauthenticated) protocols for reliable broadcast is how the
cryptography is employed: non-cryptographic protocols, in fact, may use
digital signatures just within neighbors for authentication purposes, whereas
the cryptographic protocols make use of cryptographic primitives to enable
the message verification even between non-directly connected nodes. Let us
finally remark that an authenticated channel not necessarily requires the use
of cryptography [27].
Although the Byzantine tolerant reliable broadcast problem with honest
dealer has been extensively studied considering alternative and additional
assumptions, the solution provided by Dolev [7] is the only one for general
settings and it has never been revisited from a performance perspective.
Indeed, this solution hints at poor scalability since it requires a factorial
number of copies (with respect the size of the network) of the same message
to be spread and potentially verified in order to be accepted. This suggest
that solving reliable broadcast in the weakest system model (i.e., Dolev’s
solution [7]) is practically infeasible.
Contributions
We review and improve previous solutions for reliable broadcast in multi-
hop networks, where at most f nodes can be Byzantine faulty, making no
further assumption with respect to the original setting [7]. In more details,
(i) we propose and evaluate modifications to the state of art protocols that
preserve both safety and liveness properties of the original algorithms, and
(ii) we define message selection policies in order to prevent Byzantine faulty
nodes from flooding the network and to reduce the total number of messages
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exchanged.
In a preliminary work [3], we focused on random network topologies,
we defined two modifications to the state of art protocols, we proposed
one preliminary message selection technique, and we carried out a perfor-
mance analysis in the scenario where all processes are correct. In this work,
by extensive simulations for variously shaped networks and considering ac-
tive Byzantine processes spreading spurious messages over the network, we
show that our modifications enable to keep the message complexity close
to quadratic (in the size of the network). Our work thus paves the way
for the practical use of Byzantine tolerant reliable broadcast solutions in
realistic-size networks.
System Model and Problem Statement
System Model
We consider a distributed system composed by a set of n processes Π “
tp1, p2, . . . pnu, each one having a unique integer identifier. Processes are
arranged in a communication network. This network can be seen as an
undirected graph G “ pV,Eq where each node represents a process pi P Π
(i.e. V “ Π) and each edge represents a communication channel connecting
two of them pi, pj P Π (i.e. E Ă ΠŚΠ), such that pi and pj can communi-
cate. In the following, we interchangeably use terms process and node and
we refer to edges, links and communication channels similarly.
We assume an omniscient adversary able to control up to f processes
allowing them to behave arbitrarily. We call them Byzantine processes. All
the processes that are not Byzantine faulty are correct. Correct processes
do not a priori know the subset of Byzantine processes. Processes have
no global knowledge about the system (i.e. the size or the topology of the
network) except the value of f .
Communication channels allow connected processes to exchange mes-
sages, providing two interfaces: SENDppdest,mq and RECEIVE ppsource,mq.
The former requests to send a message m to process pdest, the latter delivers
the message m sent by process psource. Processes that are not linked with
a communication channel have to rely on others that relay their messages
in order to communicate, in a multi-hop fashion. We assume reliable and
authenticated communication channels, which provide the following guar-
antees: (i) reliable delivery, namely if a correct process sends a message
m to a correct process q, then q eventually receives m; (ii) authentication,
namely if a correct process q receives a message m with sender p, then m
was previously sent to q by p.
We consider a synchronous system, namely we assume that (i) there is a
known upper bound on the message transmission delays and (ii) a known up-
per bound on the processing delays. We assume a computation that evolves
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in sequential synchronous rounds. Every round is divided in three phases:
(1) send, where processes send all the messages for the current round, (2)
receive, where processes receive all the messages sent at the beginning of the
current round and (3) computation, where processes execute the computa-
tion required by the specific protocol. In a single round, any message can
traverse exactly one hop, namely the message exchange occurs only between
neighbor processes. We measure the time in terms of the number of rounds.
Problem Statement
We consider the reliable broadcast with honest dealer problem from a source
s assuming f Byzantine failures arbitrary spread in the network [7]. A pro-
tocol solves the Byzantine tolerant Reliable Broadcast (BRB) with honest
dealer problem if the following conditions are met:
• (Safety) if a correct process delivers a message m, then it has been
previously sent by the source;
• (Liveness) if a correct source broadcast a message m, then m is be
eventually delivered by every correct process.
Notice that in the case of a correct source, all correct processes deliver the
broadcast message. Instead, if the source is Byzantine faulty, then not all
correct processes necessarily deliver the broadcast message and/or they may
deliver different messages.
We referred (following the literature) with message m to a content (i.e. a
value) that has been broadcast. Every information spreading protocol place
a content inside a message with a specific format, adding protocol related
overhead. Therefore, to ease of explanation, we refer with content to the
value that has been broadcast and with message to the one exchanged by
a protocol. Therefore, a message refers to the union of a content and the
overhead added by the employed protocols.
Background
We start by presenting and remarking some definitions and theoretical re-
sults to lead the reader in an easier understanding. Subsequently, we present
the state-of-the-art protocols solving the BRB problem and we provide an
analysis of them.
Basic Definitions and Fundamental Results
For all the definitions and results that follow, let us consider the cube graph
Gˆ depicted in Figure 1 as example.
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Figure 1: Disjoint Paths (a) and Vertex Cut (b) of a cube graph.
Definition 1 (neighbors). Given an undirected graph G “ pV,Eq, two nodes
u, v are adjacent or neighbors if there is an edge connecting them ( i.e.
tu, vu P E).
In graph Gˆ, the neighbors of node u are nodes a, b and c.
Definition 2 (path). Given an undirected graph G “ pV,Eq, a path is a
sequence of adjacent nodes without repetitions ( i.e. path :“ pv1, v2, . . . , vxq :
@i P r1, x´ 1s, vi P V, tvi, vi`1u P E). The two extreme nodes of a path are
called ends.
Definition 3 (connected nodes and connected graph). Given an undirected
graph G “ pV,Eq, two nodes u, v are connected if there exist at least one path
with ends u, v, they are disconnected otherwise. The graph G is connected
if it exist at least one path between every pair of nodes.
In graph Gˆ, the sequence pu, a, e, vq is a path with ends u and v, thus
nodes u and v are connected.
Definition 4 (independent/disjoint paths). Given an undirected graph G “
pV,Eq, two or more of its paths are independent or disjoint if they share no
node except their ends.
In graph Gˆ, the sequence pu, c, f, vq is another path that is disjoint with
respect to pu, a, e, vq.
Definition 5 (vertex cut). Given an undirected graph G “ pV,Eq, the re-
moval of a set of nodes C Ă V from G results in a subgraph GC “ pVC , ECq,
where VC “ V ´C and EC Ă E : @tvi, vju P E, tvi, vju P EC ðñ vi, vj R C.
Given two not adjacent nodes u, v P V , a vertex cut C Ă V ´tu, vu for u, v
is a set of nodes whose removal from the graph G disconnects u from v,
namely u, v are disconnected in GC .
In graph Gˆ, the set of nodes td, e, fu is a vertex cut for pu, vq, because
its removal will disconnects nodes u from v.
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Given an undirected graph G “ pV,Eq and two not adjacent nodes u, v,
the maximum number of mutually disjoint paths with ends u and v is referred
with κ1pu, vq, and the size of the smallest vertex cut C separating u from v
is referred with κpu, vq.
Remark 1 (Global Menger Theorem). A graph is k-connected (or it has
vertex connectivity equals to k) if and only if it contains k independent paths
between any two vertices.
Remark 2 (Vertex Cut VS Disjoint Paths). Let G “ pV,Eq be a graph and
u, v P V . Then the minimum number of vertexes that disconnects u from v
in G is equal to the maximum number of disjoint u´ v paths in G, namely
κpu, vq “ κ1pu, vq.
In graph Gˆ, the maximum number of disjoint paths between nodes u, v
(κ1pu, vq) is 3, as depicted in Figure 1a. Furthermore, at least 3 nodes have
to be removed from the network in order to disconnect nodes u, v (Figure
1b), thus showing the equivalence κ1pu, vq “ κpu, vq.
The reader can refer to [6] for addition details.
The Byzantine Reliable Broadcast problem can be solved under the as-
sumptions we considered in the system model when the following condition
is met:
Remark 3 (Condition for Byzantine Reliable Broadcast [7]). Given a net-
work G composed of n processes where at most f can be Byzantine faulty,
the Byzantine Reliable Broadcast can be achieved if and only if the vertex
connectivity of G is at least 2f ` 1.
Byzantine Reliable Broadcast Protocols
There exists two solutions addressing the Byzantine Reliable Broadcast with
honest dealer problem in the system model we considered, that are the
Dolev [7] and the Maurer et al. [20] algorithms. Any other solutions for the
BRB problem makes extra or different assumptions (e.g. digital signatures,
higher density networks, weaker versions of safety or liveness, etc.).
The protocols that follow are defined by:
• a propagation algorithm, which rules how messages are spread over the
network;
• a verification algorithm, that decides if a content can be accepted by
a process guaranteeing the safety of reliable broadcast.
The basic idea behind the following protocols is to leverage the authen-
ticated channels to collect the labels of processes traversed by a content, in
order to compute the maximum disjoint paths, in the case of Dolev, or the
minimum vertex cut, in the case of Maurer et al., of all the paths traversed
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by the content. Those two methodologies are theoretically equivalent due to
the Menger Theorem (Remark 2), i.e. if a message can traverse f ` 1 dis-
joint paths in a network, then it can traverse paths such that their minimum
vertex cut is f ` 1 and vice versa.
Dolev Reliable Broadcast Protocol (D-BRB)
Dolev [7] defined the seminal algorithm addressing the BRB problem. The
messages exchanged by his protocol have the format m :“ xs, content, pathy,
where s is the label of the process asserting to be the source, content is the
content to broadcast and path is a sequence of nodes.
Propagation Algorithm:
1. the source process s sends the message m “ xs, content,Hy to all of
its neighbors;
2. a correct process p saves and relays any messagem “ xs, content, pathiy
sent by a neighbor q to all of other neighbors not included in pathi,
appending to pathi the label of the sender q, namely process p stores
and multicasts m “ xs, content, pathi Y tquy.
The messages carrying pathi with loops or pathi that includes the label
of the receiving process p are discarded at reception.
Verification Algorithm:
1. given a set of messages mi “ xs, content, pathiy received by process p
and carrying the same values for s and content, the content is delivered
by p if there exist f ` 1 disjoint paths among of all the related pathi.
Maurer et al. Reliable Broadcast Protocol (MTD-BRB)
Maurer et al. [20] extended and improved the algorithm defined by Dolev to
deal with dynamic distributed systems, where the communication network
changes over the time. As a matter of facts, a static communication network
(our case) can be seen as a dynamic network that never changes, making
their solution employable on the system model we are considering.
The format of messages exchanged by their protocol is
m :“ xs, content, pathsety, again carrying the information about the process
s asserting to be the source and the content of broadcast. The difference
with respect the previous algorithm is the data structure employed to collect
the labels of traversed nodes: pathset, that it discards the traversing order.
Furthermore, MTD-BRB verifies the minimum vertex cut of the pathset
traversed by a content instead of the maximum disjoint paths. The reason is
that on dynamic networks the Menger theorem (Remark 3) does not hold,
specifically the minimum vertex cut may be greater than or equal to the
maximum disjoint paths between two nodes [15].
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Propagation Algorithm:
1. the source process s sends the m “ xs, content,Hy to all of its neigh-
bors;
2. a correct process p saves and relays any messagem “ xs, content, pathsetiy
sent by a neighbor q to all of other neighbors not included in pathseti,
appending to pathseti the label of the sender q, namely process p stores
and multicasts m “ xs, content, pathseti Y tquy.
The messages carrying pathseti with duplicates or pathseti that in-
cludes the label of the receiving process p are discarded at reception.
Verification Algorithm:
1. given a set of messages mi “ xs, content, pathsetiy received by process
p and carrying the same values of s and content, the content is deliv-
ered by p if the minimum vertex cut of the related pathseti is at least
f ` 1.
Discussion
The two protocols we presented are quiescent, namely at a certain point all
correct processes stop sending messages. To be precise, this is true only if
all processes are correct or at least the additional knowledge about the size
of the system is given to the processes to guarantee the termination of mes-
sage spreading. Contrarily, a Byzantine process may continuously introduce
spurious messages carrying ˜pathi{pathseti “ trandom labelu that are for-
warded to all processes. We temporarily assume, for ease of evaluation, that
all processes are correct in the analysis that follows. In order to evaluate
and compare the protocols reported and the solution we are going to design,
we analyze the following metrics:
1. message complexity i.e., the total number of messages exchanged in a
single broadcast (the amount of messages exchanged from the begin-
ning of the broadcast till the moment when all processes stop sending
messages);
2. delivery computational complexity i.e., the complexity of the procedure
executed by a process during the computation phase to decide if a
content can be accepted.
3. broadcast latency i.e., the time between the beginning of the broadcast
and the time when all correct processes deliver the content.
The message complexity of D-BRB protocol is factorial in the size of the
network. The reason is that for every path connecting the source with any
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other node (i.e. that are order of the permutations over the full set of
nodes) a message with related pathi is generated. This potentially results in
an factorial number of pathi to elaborate by every process in order to deliver
a single content. For sake of explaination, let us consider the cube graph
depicted in Figure 1 and let us assume that process u starts a broacast,
thus spreading a content with an empty path that will traverse the paths
pu, aq, pu, bq and pu, cq on the communication network. The neighbors of the
source will receive the content and its related (empty) path, they will attach
the label of the sender and they will forward it to all of their neighbors not
already included, e.g. process a will forwards the content with the path puq
to processes d and e and thus a message related to the paths pu, a, dq and
pu, a, eq will be generated (and the same will be done also by processes b and
c). The process d will receive the path puq from a and b (the same happens
for processes e and f from different processes). Consequently, a message
carring pu, aq will be forwarded by d to b and v and a message carrying
pu, bq will be sent by d to a and v. The messages continue to be generated
as long as all possible paths are traversed, one message for each path.
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, the only method available to
identify f `1 disjoint pathi is the reduction to a NP-Complete problem, Set
Packing [11]. We refer to this method with DP (Disjoint Paths), namely
to the reduction and solution of the associated Set Packing instance. This
implies that the delivery complexity of the algorithm is exponential.
The D-BRB guarantees the safety and liveness properties of BRB when
the strict enabling condition is met (Remark 3), respectively because the
Byzantine processes b1, b2, . . . bf cannot propagate a different content ˜content ‰
content with source s through no more than f disjoint paths, and assuming
a vertex cut of size f made by the faulty processes, f ` 1 disjoint paths are
still available between any pairs of correct processes.
The MTD-BRB protocol is equivalent with respect the message com-
plexity and delivery complexity to D-BRB. Specifically, even if all the pathsi
over the same set of nodes are all collapsed in a single pathset, they are still
factorial in the number of nodes (i.e. they are order of the combinations
over the full set of nodes), and messages carrying any possible pathseti are
generated, potentially leading to an input of factorial size for the verification
algorithm.
Again, to the best of our knowledge, the only method available to identify
a vertex cut of size less than or equal to f is the reduction to a NP-Complete
problem, Hitting Set [11]. We refer to this method as VC (Vertex Cut),
namely to the reduction and solution of the associated Hitting Set instance.
This implies that the delivery complexity of this algorithm is exponential
too.
The safety and liveness properties of BRB are guaranteed by MTD-BRB
due to the same argumentation made for D-BRB : the Byzantine processes
b1, b2, . . . bf cannot propagate a different content ˜content ‰ content with
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Dolev Maurer et al.
Message Complexity
Factorial
(Permutations of nodes)
Factorial
(Combinations of nodes)
Delivery Complexity NP NP
Broadcast Latency ď n´ k ď n´ k
Table 1: Analysis of state of art protocols
source s through pathsets with a minimum vertex cut greater than f and
they cannot make a vertex cut on the communication network greater than
f .
The broadcast latency of both protocols is bounded by the graph metric
called wide diameter [12]. Given a k-connected graph G, the wide diameter
is the maximum number l such that there exist k internally disjoint pu, vq-
paths in G of length at most l between any pair of vertices u and v. This
value depends on the graph topology. In the worst case, the wide diameter of
a graph is n´k [13]. It follows that the broadcast latency of both protocols
is upper bounded by n ´ k, because in at most n ´ k rounds k disjoint
path are traversed between every pair of nodes. As a clarifying example,
let us consider a k-connected generlized wheel graph with n nodes, that is
composed by the disjoint union between a cycle and a k´2 clique (a grafical
example is depicted in Figure 5b) and let us chose as source a node on the
cycle and let us focus on one of its neighbors on the cycle at distance two.
It is possible to verify that in order to interconnect the pair of nodes we
are considering through k disjoint paths, one path of length n´ k has to be
traversed.
The Table 1 summarizes the presented analysis.
Practical Reliable Broadcast Protocol
Due to the high message complexity and delivery computational complexity
of the reviewed protocols, they do no scale and they cannot be successfully
employed.
We further analyze some deeper details of the aforementioned protocols
and we define simple modifications that result in drastically reducing the
message complexity. Specifically, we start by arguing that pathsets and VC
should be preferred respectively as message format and verification algo-
rithm. Subsequently, we propose modifications that aim in reducing the
amount of messages spread by preventing from forwarding useless messages,
thus redefining a protocol solving BRB.
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Paths VS Pathsets
It is possible to note that, given the solutions available, there is no reason to
prefer path over pathset while collecting the label of the traversed processes,
indeed: (i) due to the reduction to set related problems, paths are converted
into sets to be analyzed; (ii) two paths over the same set of nodes are not
disjoint and have a cut of size equal to 1, and (iii) the pathsets intercon-
necting two endpoints are fewer than the relative paths. For those reasons
we adopt the pathset data structure as message format to collect the labels
of traversed processes in designing an improved protocol.
Minimum Vertex Cut VS Maximum Disjoint Paths
We remark that both verification algorithms solve a NP-Complete problems
and, considering the Menger theorem in Remark 2, one may conclude that
there is no tangible reason to prefer one among VC and DP. As a matter
of fact, the equivalence between the two metrics in Remark 2 occurs when
no restriction on the length of the paths is assumed. In fact, when the path
lenght is bounded, the minimum vertex cut between two nodes may be higher
than or equal to the maximum number of disjoint paths interconnecting
them [16]. Let us take the example proposed in Figure 2 [16], let us focus
on nodes u and v as endpoints and consider only the paths of length at
most 5. It can be verified that at least two nodes have to be removed from
the graph in order to disconnect u from v considering only the paths of
length at most 5. Nevertheless, no two disjoint paths exist considering only
the paths with the same constraint. In other words, given a graph G of n
nodes and considering only the paths of length at most l ă n, the size of
the minimum vertex cut of those interconnecting two nodes may be greater
than or equal to the maximum number of disjoint paths interconnecting
them. This implies that, whenever a synchronous system is assumed and
the paths are all traversed synchronously like in our system model (i.e. the
path of length 1 are all traversed in 1 instant (round), the paths of length
2 are all traversed in two instant (round) and so on), it may be possible to
interconnect two endpoints with a minimum cut equal to k in fewer hops
(i.e. rounds) with respect k disjoint paths. This results also in saving in
message complexity if a halting condition is embedded inside the protocol,
namely if the message propagation stops when all correct processes delivered
the content. For this reason we adopt VC as verification methodology.
Improvements
Practical Reliable Broadcast Protocol (BFT-BRB)
We redefine a protocol for the Byzantine Reliable Broadcast with honest
dealer. This protocol employs the same message format and verification
12
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Figure 2: Graph example to compare minimum vertex cut and max-
imum disjoint paths.
algorithm of MTD-BRB, namely the label of the processes traversed by a
message are collected in pathsets and the contents are verified through the
VC methodology. We introduce four modifications in the propagation al-
gorithm and one in the verification algorithm that aim to reduce the total
number of messages exchanged and we prove their correctness, namely that
their employment do not prevent the original algorithms of Dolev and Mau-
rer et al. from enforcing safety and liveness of Byzantine Reliable Broadcast
with honest dealer when the strict enabling condition is met (Remark 3),
because they prevent from forwarding messages that are not useful for the
delivery of a content.
Modification 1. If a process p receives a content directly from the source s
( i.e. the source and the sender coincides), then it is directly delivered by p.
Modification 2. If a process p has delivered a content, then it can discard
all the related pathsets and relay the content only with an empty pathset to
all of its neighbors.
Modification 3. A process p relays pathsets related to a content only to the
neighbors that have not yet delivered it.
Modification 4. If a process p receives a content with an empty pathset
from a neighbor q, then p can discard from relaying and analyzing any further
pathset related to the content that contains the label of q.
Modification 5. A process p stops relaying further pathsets related to a
content after it has been delivered and the empty pathset has been forwarded.
The modification 1 follows from the defitions of disjoint paths and vertex
cut, indeed a path of lenght two is disjoint with respect every other one with
the same ends, and the vertex cut is defined between not adjacent nodes,
thus there is no vertex cut between neighbors..
The purpose of modifications 2, 3, and 4 is to reduce the amount of
messages exchanged by the protocol and to be analyzed by processes. The
modification 2 also provides a transparent way to get the neighbors q of a
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process p know that a specific content has been delivered by p. This one has
already been employed [22] for the purpose of topology reconstruction.
The modification 5 introduces a halting condition in the protocol with
respect the state of art, indeed all correct processes stop from relaying fur-
ther messages at the round subsequent the last delivery of a process. Fur-
thermore, this modifications makes the original solutions quiescent without
assuming that processes know the size of system.
Let us consider the network topology depicted in Figure 1a as an example
to detail the advantages introduced by the presented modifications. Let us
select node u as source process and let us consider the all the paths of lenght
two starting from u, namely pu, c, fq, pu, c, eq, pu, b, fq, pu, b, dq, pu, a, dq, pu, a, eq.
Processes d, e and f , following modification 1 will relay only an empty
path instead of extending the paths they received, namely avoiding to gen-
erate pu, c, f, vq, pu, c, e, vq, pu, b, f, vq, pu, b, d, vq, pu, a, d, vq, pu, a, e, vq.
Processes d, e and f , leveraging modification 1, know that the nodes a, b
and c have already delivered the content associated to the paths. Applying
modification 2, processes d, e and f do not relay further paths to a, b
and c, namely they do not generate paths pu, c, f, bq, pu, c, e, aq, pu, b, f, cq,
pu, b, d, aq, pu, a, d, bq, pu, a, e, cq.
The modification 3 applies in cases a process p receives paths in round
ri but it delivers the associated content in a round rj ą ri. A neighbor q
of p that has not yet delivered the content will get the extension of paths
received by p in ri and potentially the empty path in rj`1. The modification
3 enables q to discard from the analysis in delivering the associated content
all paths previously received from p and to consider only the empty pathset.
The pseudo code of our protocol is presented in Figure 3. For the ease of
explanation and notation, we show the procedure and variables only related
to the broadcast of a single content spread by s.
Initially, every process is not aware about the nodes in its neighborhood
but it can easily retrieve them with authenticated channels. For every not
delivered content, a process stores (i) the received pathsets related to the
content (Pathsets variable), (ii) the pathsets not yet relayed (To Forward
variable) and (iii) the labels of neighbors that have delivered the content
(Neigh Del variable).
Every process starts the round with the send phase, namely selecting the
messages to forward and transmitting them. In particular, it extracts part
or all of the message related to a content to relay (select function), and it
forwards them to all of its neighbors that have not yet delivered the content,
thus applying modification 3 in line 8.
During the receive phase, for every received message related to a content
not yet delivered, the label of the sender is attached to the received pathset
and the resulting collection is stored in order to be considered for the delivery
and to be forwarded (we assume an implicit mechanism avoiding duplicate
pathsets). The modification 2 enables a process p to know that a sender q
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has delivered the content (line 15). Then, the modification 3 allows p to
discard part of the pathset previously received (lines 17´ 22) and that may
arrive (line 13).
Finally, in the computation phase, all received pathsets related to the
content are analyzed. Specifically, in case a process has received the content
directly from the source s (i.e. the sender and the source coincides, the
receiver has received the pathset tsu, line 26, modification 1) or the minimum
vertex cut computed on Pathsets is greater than f , it delivers the content,
it discards all the pathsets not yet forwarded and it enqueues to relay the
empty pathset, namely applying modification 2 in lines 30, 31.
The implementation of modification 5 can be found in line 12. Indeed,
once that a process has delivered the content, it discards all the residual
pathsets to forward (line 30). In the receive phase all the messages related
to the content already delivered are discarded (line 12) due to modification
4, thus the select function in line 6 only extracts the empty pathset in the
round subsequent the delivery.
We prove the correctness of the proposed modifications thought the fol-
lowing theorems (assuming the system model we presented and under the
assumption of the strict condition in Remark 3).
Theorem 1. Let p be a process executing either the Dolev or the Maurer
et al. algorithm to broadcast a content. If p delivers a content received
directly from the source, then the safety property continues to be satisfied
( i.e. employing modification 1).
Proof. It follows directly from the property of the channels (reliable and au-
thenticated), indeed the channels guarantee that every received message has
been previously sent by the sender, that coincides with the safety property
of reliable broadcast.
Theorem 2. Let p be a process executing either the Dolev or the Maurer
et al. algorithm to broadcast a content. If p delivered a content, then p
can relay that content with an empty path/pathset and the safety property
continues to be satisfied ( i.e. employing modification 2).
Proof. The aim of the information about the nodes traversed by a content is
to enable a process p to decide whether it can be safely accepted. Once it has
been delivered, the information about the nodes traversed before reaching p
is not useful, because the content has been already verified as safe by p.
Theorem 3. Let p be a process executing either the Dolev or the Maurer et
al. algorithm to broadcast a content and let us assume that the modification
2 is employed. Even if p does not relay messages carrying the content to
its neighbors that already delivered it, the liveness property continues to be
satisfied ( i.e. employing modification 3).
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Figure 3: Byzantine Tolerant Reliable Broadcast with honest dealer
Protocol.
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Proof. Let us assume that there exists three processes p, q, r such that only
q has already delivered the content and that, among others, the following
communication channels are available: pp, qq, pq, rq. From Theorem 2 we
know that process q can safely relay the content with an empty path/pathset
(i.e. employing modification 2). Thus, any further path/pathset containing
p and q, after the delivery of q, does not affect the results of DP and VC
verifying the content on r. It follows that any further transmission related
to the content from p to q can be avoided after that q has delivered without
compromising liveness.
Theorem 4. Let p be a process executing either the Dolev or the Maurer
et al. algorithm to broadcast a content and let us assume that the modifi-
cation 2 is employed. If process p receives an empty path/pathset relative
to a content from a neighbor q, than p can discard from its analysis and
from relaying further path/pathset containing the label of q and the liveness
property continues to be satisfied ( i.e. employing modification 4).
Proof. Let us assume that there exists three processes p, q, r such that only
p has already delivered a content and that, among others, the following
communication channels are available: pp, qq, pp, rq. We have to prove that
process p can discard, verifying the associated content, further path/pathset
containing the label of q but tqu without affecting the liveness property. This
follows from the fact that path/pathset of unit lenght are included in every
solution of the VC and DP and that any path/pathset containing more labels
does not increase the value computed by VC and DP. We have to prove that
this reasoning extends also for process r, so that process p can avoid relaying
further path/pathset over tqu. On process r, any path/pathset that extends
tq, pu does not increase the value obtained by VC and DP. It follows that
any other path/pathset over tqu has not to be relayed.
Theorem 5. Let p be a process executing either Dolev or Maurer et al.
algorithm to broadcast a content and let us assume that the modification
2 is employed. If p has delivered and relayed the content with an empty
path/pathset to all of its neighbors, then p can stop from relaying further
related paths/pathsets and the liveness property continues to be satisfied ( i.e.
employing modification 5).
Proof. It follows from the fact that any further path/pathset related to the
content received and relayed by p does not increase the minimum cut/the
maximum disjoint paths computed on other processes with respect the
empty path/pathset relayed by p. Said differently, all the neighbors of p
receive the paths/pathset tpu and any further path/pathset relayed by p be-
comes t. . . , pu, increasing neither the minimum vertex cut nor the maximum
disjoint paths.
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Preventing Flooding and Forwarding Policies.
We highlighted the fact that the verification algorithm has potentially to
analyze a factorial, in the size of the network, amount of pathsets even
only considering all processes to be correct. Nevertheless, a Byzantine
process b can potentially flood the network with spurious messages (i.e.,
m˜ :“ xs˜, ˜content, ˜pathsety where s˜, ˜content and ˜pathset can be invented by
the faulty process) that are also diffused by the correct ones. Considering
that the amount of messages plays a crucial impact on the employment of
the protocol we defined, a countermeasure must be researched.
A common way to limit the flooding capability of Byzantine processes
is to constraint the channel capacity of every process, namely limiting the
amount of messages that every process is allowed to send in a time window.
Noticed that, by introducing such a constraint, we are limiting the re-
laying capability of every process, while the Byzantine processes can contin-
uously generate spurious messages potentially preventing the liveness prop-
erty to be satisfied. It follows that a selection policy among all the messages
to relay is demanded.
Every process has to relay pathsets to all of its neighbors that have not
yet delivered the content. A pathset that may lead a neighbor q to the
delivery of the associated content has not to contain the label of q (because
it would be directly discarded), namely a process p has to select among the
pathsets to forward the ones that do not include the label of q. There may
be many pathsets that do not include q. Thus, we consider and evaluate two
selection policies: (i) Multi-Random and (ii) Multi-Shortest . The Multi-
Random is an extension of the forwarding policy proposed in [3].
The algorithms for the pathsets selection implementing the Multi-Random
and Multi-Shortest policies are presented in Figure 4. The selection itera-
tively picks one pathset and checks if it is “useful” for any neighbor (i.e.
if any neighbor to contact is not included in the pathset). This selection
continues till (i) all the neighbors to contact receives at least one pathset
where they are not included or (ii) the bound on channel capacity has been
reached. The Multi-Random policy iteratively picks randomly a possible
pathset to forward, the Multi-Shortest gives priority to the shorter ones.
We compare and analyzed them both in the following.
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Figure 4: Multi-Shortest and Multi-Random Policies.
Practical Reliable Broadcast Evaluation
We simulate the protocol and the policies we proposed in order to eval-
uate their effectiveness and to compare our protocol with the state-of-art
solutions.
According to the system model we defined, we simulate single broadcasts
that evolves in rounds. Therefore, the passage of time is measured in number
of rounds.
We made use of the implementation provided by Gainer-Dewar and Vera-
Licona [10] for the algorithm defined by Murakami and Uno [21] to solve the
VC reduction to the hitting set problem.
We consider the following parameters in our simulation:
• n, i.e. the size of the network considered;
• k, i.e. the vertex connectivity of the network considered;
• topology, i.e. the topology of network considered;
• channel capacity, i.e. the maximum number of messages that a process
can send in a link per round;
• kind of failure, i.e. how faulty process behave;
• forwarding policy, i.e. one among Multi-Shortest and Multi-Random .
In order to carry an analysis as complete as possible, we consider the fol-
lowing network topologies:
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• k-regular k-connected random graph [25];
• k-pasted-tree [1];
• k-diamond [1];
• multipartite wheel;
• generalized wheel [26];
• Baraba´si-Albert graph [2].
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5: Graph topologies. n “ 24, k “ 4. (a) multipartite wheel, (b)
generalized wheel, (c) k-pasted-tree, (d) k-diamond.
A graph is regular if every node is connected to the same number of
neighbors, namely in a k-regular graph every node is connected exactly to
k neighbors. The k-regular k-connected graphs have vertex connectivity
equals to k with the minimum necessary number of edges. The k-regular k-
connected random graphs are the ones uniformly sampled among all possible
regular graphs employing the sampling methodology defined in [25].
The k-pasted-trees and k-diamond graphs are Logarithmic Harary Graph
[14], namely topologies designed to be robust to failures and suited for dis-
tributed systems where the information spreading occurs by message flood-
ing. Indeed, they are k-connected graphs with a logarithmic diameter and
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with minimal edges guaranteeing the node-connectivity (i.e. the removal of
an edge decreases vertex connectivity of the network). For specific values
of network size n and vertex connectivity k they are k-regular. A graphi-
cal example of k-pasted-trees and k-diamond are respectively presented in
Figures 5c and 5d.
We refer with multipartite wheel to a regular graph composed by the
concatenation of disjoint groups of k{2 nodes such that every node in a
group is connected to exactly all the k{2 nodes in other 2 groups and no
node inside a group is connected with others of the same group. A graphical
example is provided in Figure 5a.
Notice that k-regular k-connected graphs can be constructed in several
ways, indeed we are considering four different constructions that are either
always regular or regular for specific settings. The sequel demonstrates that
the specific construction impacts protocol performance.
We considered also the Baraba´si-Albert graphs that models complex and
social networks with scale-free power law degree distribution. The aim is to
evaluate our protocol also on topologies not designed for distributed systems.
Finally, we consider the generalized wheel, i.e. the topology generated
by the disjoint union between a cycle and a k ´ 2 clique. An example can
be found in Figure 5b. It has been considered as a worst case scenario.
We carry our simulations either considering the maximum number of
tolerable faulty processes, thus for every k-connected network we assume
f “ tpk ´ 1q{2u failures (Remark 3), or we tested all possible values for f
between 0 and tpk´1q{2u. In any case, processes deliver a content only when
the related pathsets have a minimum vertex cut greater than tpk ´ 1q{2u.
We consider two configurations for the channel capacity: bounded and
unbounded. The former constrains processes to send a limited number of
messages per link in every round, the latter imposes no restriction. For the
bounded case we assume a bound for the channel capacity equal to f ` 1
messages.
The source code of the presented simulations can be found online [4].
Simulating Byzantine Behaviours
We move from the scenario where all processes are correct, to the case
where the f Byzantine processes act as crash failures, (thus not relaying any
message, we refer to them as passive Byzantines), till the case they spread
spurious messages (we refer to them as active Byzantines). Specifically to
this last scenario, we have to notice that spurious contents (i.e. contents
generated by Byzantine processes bi ‰ s sent inside a message with source
s) are never accepted by correct processes (if the BRB enabling condition
in Remark 2 is met) and their spreading and verification is disjoint with
respect the content broadcast by the source (because they are related to a
different s - content). For this reason we impose to Byzantine processes to
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spread only spurious pathsets in our simulations (thus relaying the content
broadcast by the source). The purpose is to flood the correct processes with
spurious pathsets trying to not facilitate the achievement of the delivery
condition. In detail, the Byzantine processes diffuse pathsets containing the
label of one correct neighbor of the receiver in the first round, and pathseths
containing one of the correct neighbor of the receiver with a random label
in the subsequent rounds. Every Byzantine process sends f ` 1 messages
(the maximum amount allowed by the channel capacity) containing different
pathsets on every of its link per round.
Additionally, we consider two kinds of active Byzantine processes: om-
niscient and general. Omniscient active faulty processes know the content
that the source is going to spread before receiving it through a message,
thus they start flooding correct processes with spourious pathsets from the
beginning of broadcast. General active faulty processes, instead, spreads
spurious pathsets in the round subsequent the first reception of a message
containing the content, namely as soon as they get knowledge about the
content through the network. Notice that there are other strategies that
Byzantine processes may adopt generating spourious pathsets, especially if
such Byzantines are omniscient about the state of all other processes. The
Byzantine strategy that we adopted has been choosen to allows faulty pro-
cesses to generate pathsests that may be selected by the correct process due
to their lenght.
In every simulation, the source and the Byzantine processes are randomly
placed.
For all the results we are going to show we directly plot all the measures
we got as points (except for Figures 6,15,16 where the mean of the measures
is depicted) in order to show their distributions, and we accordingly increase
the size of the points with higher density.
Comparison with the state of art
We start comparing the message complexity of the state of art solutions
with our protocol. We consider k-regular k-connected random graphs, we
assume the vertex connectivity k equal to 3 and 5 and we simulate D-BRB,
MTD-BRB and BFT-MTB considering unbounded channels and all correct
processes, and we vary the size of the network from n “ 6 to n “ 20. We
previously remarked about the lack in the state of art protocols of a halting
condition, indeed they generate all source-to-other paths/pathsets in every
execution. It can be noticed in Figure 6 that the modifications we defined
have a remarkable impact on the message complexity even in a small and
all-correct scenario. It can also be noticed the advantage gained by choosing
pathsets over paths, as expected.
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Figure 6: State of art VS our protocol, message complexity. Random
regular network, unbounded channels, f =tpk´ 1q{2u all correct. (a) k “ 3,
(b) k “ 5.
Multi-Random VS Multi-Shortest
We proposed as a countermeasure against the capability of Byzantine pro-
cesses to flood the network a constraint on the channel capacity, namely
limiting the amount of messages that a process can send over a link per
round, and we set this bound equal to f ` 1. Then, we proposed two for-
warding policies to select which pathsets relay in the actual round. Assuming
bounded channels, we compare the presented policies, Multi-Random and
Multi-Shortest , considering networks of size n “ 100, topologies random
regular, multipartite wheel, k-diamond and k-pasted-tree, passive Byzan-
tine failures. The results are presented in Figures 7 and 8 (notice that
scale of the graphics in Figure 7 are logarithmic). Starting with the Multi-
Random policy, it can be seen in Figures 7 that, while for some graphs the
Multi-Random policy acts smoothly, the random regular (confirming the
results achieved in our preliminary work [3]) the multipartite wheel graphs
and the k-diamond, there exist topologies where the broadcast latency and
message complexity may conspicuously increase (k-pasted-tree). It follows
that on some kind of graphs the selections of paths that the Multi-Random
policy may take are not equivalment with respect the protocol progression
and that additional criterion have to be considered in the selection. This
lead us to discard such a policy to be one generally employable. Contrarily,
the performance achieved employing the Multi-Shortest policy appears not
affected by this misbehaviour (Figures 8). Therefore, we further investigate
the Multi-Shortest policy while increasing the size of the network.
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Figure 7: Multi-Random policy n “ 100, f =tpk ´ 1q{2u passive Byzan-
tines, bounded channels, message complexity and broadcast latency.
Multi-shortest policy detailed evaluation
We assume bounded channels and the Multi-Shortest policy, considering
networks of size n “ 150 and n “ 200, topologies random regular, multi-
partite wheel, k-diamond and k-pasted-tree, passive and active Byzantine
failures. First results are presented in Figures 9 and 10. It is possible to
see that the trends of the message complexity and broadcast latency keep
defined employing our protocol joined with the Multi-Shortest policy while
increasing the size of the network and considering passive Byzantine fail-
ures. Specifically, the message complexity keeps always close or below the
n2 boundary. It can also be deduced that a regular network not necessarily
results in optimal performances employing our protocol, indeed there are
notable differences in the results obtained considering different topologies.
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Figure 8: Multi-Shortest policy, message complexity and broadcast
latency, passive Byzantines, bounded channels, n “ 100, f =tpk ´
1q{2u.
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Figure 9: Multi-Shortest policy, message complexity and broadcast
latency, passive Byzantines, bounded channels, n “ 150, f =tpk ´
1q{2u.
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Figure 10: Multi-Shortest policy, message complexity and broadcast
latency, passive Byzantines, bounded channels, n “ 200, f =tpk ´
1q{2u.
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It can also be noticed from the distribution of the measures that there are
several topologies (K-Pasted-Tree, K-Diamond and expecially Multipartite
wheel) where the placement of the source and the Byzantine failures plays
a remarkable impact on the message complexity. Additional details will be
later provided.
To evaluate the effects of the Multi-Shortest policy on the broadcast
latency, we simulate the BFT-BRB protocol employing either the Multi-
Shortest policy or unbounded channels, considering passive Byzantine pro-
cesses and networks of size n “ 100. It can be deduced (Figure 11) that the
policy we defined introduces negligible delays.
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Figure 11: Delay forwarding policy. X-axis: network connectivity, Y-
axis: broadcast latency, fist row: Multi-Shortest bounded channel, second
row: unbounded channel, n “ 50, f “ tpk ´ 1q{2u passive Byzantine.
We move to consider the case of active Byzatine processes, specifically
in Figure 12 general active (non omniscient) Byzantine faults are assumed.
It can be noticed that, spreading spourious pathsets (using the strategy we
defined) once they get knowledge about a content, the Byzantine processes
have no negative impact on the message complexity. As a matter of facts
they may even help correct processes achieving reliable broadcast (because
they relay the content even if they try not to increase the VC on the receiving
processes).
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Figure 12: Multi-Shortest policy, message complexity with ei-
ther passive or non omniscient (general) Byzantine. n “ 100,
f “ tpk ´ 1q{2u, bounded channels. (a) random regular, (b) multipartite
wheel (c) k-pasted-tree, (d) k-diamond.
We consider the case of omniscient Byzantine faulty processes, which
start spreading spurious pathset about the content from the beginning of
broadcast. The results we obtained are presented in Figures 13, 14. It is
possible to see that such stronger Byzantine faults are able to remarkably
increase the message complexity, nonetheless it keeps close to the n2 thresh-
old.
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Figure 13: Multi-Shortest policy, omniscient Byzantine faults. n “
100, f “ tpk ´ 1q{2u, bounded channels.
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Figure 14: Multi-Shortest policy, omniscient active Byzantine
faults. n “ 150, f =tpk ´ 1q{2u, bounded channels.
Varying the number of failures
We evaluate how the message complexity evolves when the number of faulty
processes is not maximized. We plotted the results we obtained in Figures
15,16. Whatever is the amout of failures, processes deliver a content only if
the associated minimum cut is greater than tpk ´ 1q{2u.
It is possible to deduce that the resulting message complexity depends on
the specific topology considered and on the degree of connectivity. Specifi-
cally, both in case of passive and omniscient active Byzantine faults, there
are settings where the message complexity remains constant independently
from the number of effective failures and others where the message complex-
ity increases exponentially with the number of failures.
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Figure 15: Multi-Shortest policy, varying the number of faults, mes-
sage complexity, passive Byzantines. n “ 100.
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Figure 16: Multi-Shortest policy, varying the number of faults, mes-
sage complexity, active omniscient Byzantines. n “ 100.
Baraba´si-Albert graph
We separately evaluated in Figure 17 our algorithm in a Baraba´si-Albert
graph while varying the attachment parameter m, in order analyze our pro-
tocol on a topology with different degree distribution with respect the pre-
vious analyzed. The BFT-BRB protocol and the Multi-Shortest forwarding
policy shown to keep performing in the same manner. To allow the reader
to make a comparison with the other topologies, we plot in Figure 18 the
relation between the attachment parameter m and the network connectivity.
These simulations allow us to conclude that a Byzantine tolerable reliable
broadcast protocol practically employable in synchronous systems without
considering further assumptions with respect the state of art is achievable.
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Figure 17: Multi-Shortest policy, Barababasi-Albert Network, mes-
sage complexity. f =tpk ´ 1q{2u, bounded channels, n “ 100, 150, 200 (a)
passive Byzantines, (b) active omniscient Byzantines.
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Figure 18: Barababasi-Albert Network, relation between the at-
tachment parameter m and the network connectivity
Worst Case Scenarios
For the ease of completeness, we briefly survey two worst case scenarios: the
multipartite wheel and the generalized wheel. In Figure 19a is summarized
one of executions we are going to present. Let us consider the multipartite
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wheel of size n “ 21 and k “ 6, choose a node as source (in Figure 19a
depicted in orange) and place two faulty processes (in red) in its neighbor-
hood in distinct groups (i.e. those neighbor will have different neighbors). It
results that only two correct processes per group delivers the content during
the first round. Subsequently, they relay the message to all the nodes in the
consecutive group. But, none of this node is able to deliver the message: the
minimum cut of the generated paths is 2 and processes demand paths with
minimum cut at least 3. The nodes succeed in delivering the message only
when “the propagation on the two sides met”, achieving a minimum cut of
4. It can be noticed that a considerable amount of paths may be generated
in this specific worst case scenario while the values of n and k increases.
Nonetheless, the BFT-BRB protocol and the Multi-Shortest policy reduced
such a message complexity case as shown in Figures 8, 9 and 10. We addi-
tionally simulate in Figure 20a our protocol with the Multi-Shortest policy
on a multipartite wheel of size n “ 100 with passive Byzantine in the worst
placement.
(a) (b)
Figure 19: Worst case scenarios. Multi-Partite Wheel (a) and General-
ized Wheel (b).
Another worst case scenario is depicted in Figure 19b. Let us assume a
generalized wheel, pick a source on the cycle and the Byzantine processes
always located on the clique. The Figure 20b show that in this specific case
our algorithm and the Multi-Shortest policy are less effective in reducing
the message complexity while Byzantine processes are located in the clique.
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Figure 20: Multi-Shortest policy, generalized wheel, worst Byzan-
tine placementm passive Byzantine. (a) multipartite wheel, (b) gener-
alized wheel.
Conclusion
We revisited available solutions for the reliable broadcast in general network
hit by up to f arbitrarily distributed Byzantine failures, and proposed mod-
ifications following performance related observations. Although the delivery
complexity of our protocol remains unchanged with respect the state-of-
art solutions, our experiments show that it is possible to drastically reduce
the message complexity (from factorial to polynomial in the size of the net-
work), practically enabling reliable broadcast in larger systems and networks
with authenticated channels. There are several open problems that may fol-
lows: is it possible to define a solution to the hitting set problem suited
for the specific input generated by our protocol? Is it possible to remove
from the system the contents generated by Byzantine processes? And un-
der which assumption? Which are the graph parameters that govern the
message complexity of our protocol? Our results open to the possibility of
identifying a polynomial theoretical bound on message complexity solving
the reliable broadcast problem with honest dealer. Finally, the Bizantine
Reliable Broadcast problem should be analyzed also on dynamic networks.
Even if the protocol we proposed can directly be employed on asynchronous
and/or dynamic systems, the achieved gain in message complexity is not
guaranteed due to the weaker synchrony assumptions, and probably specific
assumption on the evolution of the system must be guaranteed in searching
a practical employable solution.
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